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That so many of their assets continue to be held in governmental trusts under outdated policy 
rationales creates great difficulty for indigenous peoples.  But restoring control of those assets 
to their rightful owners will impose daunting responsibilities on judiciaries.  Exchanging assets 
for a residual share of returns from a joint venture exposes one to shirking by co-investors.  
Judiciaries known reliably to penalize those who renege on commitments help investors 
persuade others to sink complementary assets in promising projects.  But a court is an arm of 
the sovereign.  Across history and geography justifiable rulings adverse to sovereigns have so 
often been honored in the breach that private parties are especially leery of sovereigns as co-
investors.  To attract assets into its realm a sovereign may thus invest in a reputation for 
abiding by waivers of sovereign immunity, or rely on a still stronger sovereign to bond its 
waivers.  Reputations arise from observed court successes by aggrieved co-investors when their 
suits against the sovereign are meritorious.  But many tribal reservations are small and poor, 
have offered few investment opportunities, and hence possess thin legal histories.  At the same 
time, investors are skeptical that courts of more powerful sovereigns such as Canada and the 
United States dependably bond tribal waivers.  Thus tribes often must pay investors high risk-
premiums, resort to costly tribal ownership, or even forego promising opportunities altogether.  
The Sovereign’s Paradox refers to the difficulty that an entity with power to compel involuntary 
outcomes has in negotiating voluntary ones.  This chapter explores ways to ameliorate that 
Paradox and thus improve returns from reservation assets.   
   
                                                 
* Haddock is Professor of Law and of Economics at Northwestern University, and Senior Associate, 
PERC.  Miller, an enrolled member of the Shawnee Tribe, is Associate Professor of Law at Lewis & 
Clark University, and an Appellate Judge for Oregon’s Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde 
Community and for Washington’s Northwest Intertribal Court System.  We have benefited from 
commentary by Bruce Benson, by those attending Lewis & Clark Law School’s 2003 Conference on 
Community Development, and by those attending a presentation at the 2003 Southern Economic 
Association Meetings. 
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FACETS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Institutions that Spur and Institutions that Retard Tribal Development 
An unanticipated landmass thwarted Columbus’s search for a westward route to 
the Orient.  Instead of Hindi—Indians as Columbus understood the term—he 
encountered an unrelated people but mistook them for the same.  From surviving and 
reconstructed evidence the American Indians seem an energetic people bearing one of 
the world’s lowest parasite loads (McNeill 1976).  At first contact explorers noted that 
the salmon fishing tribes of the Pacific Northwest were well nourished and remarkably 
robust in comparison with Europeans of the day (Johnsen 1986).  Adult height 
correlates positively with health, and no later than the nineteenth century the bison-
hunting equestrian plains Indians numbered among the world’s tallest people (Steckel 
and Prince 2001; 2003).   
What demon’s road led from there to today’s withered tribal reservations?  That 
Indians now occupy a tiny fraction of their ancestral land was a predictable 
manifestation of disequilibria in population densities that are still adjusting.  Though 
some land was undeniably seized from tribes without compensation, at other times 
impressive financial and real resources were placed into accounts held for them—
unusual in the history of military displacement of a weaker population.
1  Even those 
tribes languish.  Why? 
Those third-world islands could converge economically with their surroundings 
but for stubborn institutional inertia—the governments of both the United States and 
Canada treat Indians as less capable than others of properly utilizing their property, even 
now holding many assets in trust as a failed safeguard.  When no relevant external effect 
ensues, the economist’s concept of consumer sovereignty—the title’s first facet—
forbids challenging individual preferences.  An informed Indian who actually preferred 
unmarketable thorns and succeeded in growing them would not have mismanaged the 
family plot, no matter the neighbors’ opinions.  A trustee inattentively permitting that 
plot to go to thorns is a different matter entirely.  Indeed mismanagement of Indian 
resources is appalling, but bureaucrats rather than individual Indians are implicated. 
Taking as given their portfolio of treaty entitlements, marked efficiencies would 
flow from giving Indians the same rights as their fellow citizens to plan and conduct 
                                                 
1 Contrast the practice in North America with the so-called ethnic cleansing recently practiced in the 
Balkans, or the massive compelled population movements during the Soviet Union’s early history. 
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their own lives.  By the plain meaning of many treaties, that would require restoring 
substantial sovereignty to those people both as tribes and as individuals. 
But this paper also contains a cautionary note—sovereignty comes in varieties, 
and some varieties threaten those who might be of the most aid to Indians, potential 
investors.  An offer to limit one’s own discretion (i.e., to weaken one’s sovereign 
power) may be necessary to achieve consensual, mutually beneficial undertakings.  But 
making the limitation credible requires a judiciary as sensitive to future opportunities to 
be gained and lost as to past equities.  Correctly or incorrectly, investors are skeptical 
that courts fully perceive the value of such voluntary limitations when Indian 
sovereignty is at issue. 
 
I. FALLING  BEHIND 
In 1492 less than ten percent of the human race occupied the more than thirty 
percent of the world’s habitable land that lies in the Americas.  Contrast that with the 
Eastern Hemisphere.  Europe, the sector experiencing the most protracted interaction 
with America, held more than half again that population on a quarter the area, an 
unadjusted population density more than six times the American.
2    
As Columbus landed the Indians bore one of the world’s lowest parasite loads 
because sparse populations concentrate too few victims to long maintain epidemics, or 
unfortunately to induce much immunity.  Virulent pathogenic mutations may utterly 
depopulate originating sites before the nascent disease becomes endemic across a larger 
region.  Indian nutrition was predicated on land-intensive production techniques.   
Certainly by the time Lewis and Clark passed through, the United States was supporting 
a robust indigenous population in many locales (Johnsen 1986; Ambrose 1996; Steckel 
and Prince 2001), a characteristic evading much of Europe until recent decades.   
                                                 
 
2 Beyond excluding Antarctica, no adjustment was made for soil fertility, climate, terrain, infrastructure, 
or the like.  Such adjustments would be meaningless without accounting for contemporaneous economic 
conditions—rising fiber prices convert desert into high-yield (albeit high cost) irrigated cotton fields, 
rising grain prices convert open access prairie into demarcated (albeit low-yield) dry-land wheat fields.  
Falling prices reverse those processes.  Even the direction a quality adjustment would move the ratio is 
unclear, but clearly it did not negate a 6 to 1 unadjusted ratio—population densities have continued to 
converge to this day.  Europe, still on a quarter as much land, now has about eighty-five percent of the 
population of the Americas, so the intercontinental density ratio, 3.4 to 1, has fallen nearly to half its pre-
Columbian level. 
    3
The land-intensity:nutrition nexus is empirical—a lower land-to-labor ratio 
hardly compels lower per capita consumption in a world with capital.  A growing 
human population occupies the world’s unchanging area, yet contrary to the dire 
predictions of the Club of Rome consumption per capita has increased dramatically in 
nearly every locale over the past several millennia because capital investments have 
more than compensated for the falling land-to-labor ratio.   
It is useful to distinguish physical capital from human capital, and to subdivide 
human capital into investments such as education that unavoidably die with the 
possessor versus technology, which often survives.  In theory each American might 
have made the more substantial investment in physical and educational capital as that 
economy responded to its dearth of labor, or alternatively Europeans could have proven 
the more avid investors as that economy reacted to a dearth of land.  Empirically the 
latter appears to have been true, but European physical and educational capital, though 
greater per capita, were inadequate fully to compensate for her land deficiency. 
Both as theory and empirics however, the Eastern Hemisphere held a 
pronounced advantage over America for technological capital, which has public good 
attributes when it can cheaply be retained through education.  Assuming it spreads 
thoroughly, resources need be expended but once to create a given technology.  So a 
more populous economy innovates at less initial cost per capita and all else equal would 
predictably be more innovative.  It is unsurprising that European technology—crucially 
European military technology—led the American. One of Columbus’s earliest reports to 
Ferdinand and Isabella foreshadowed impending events through its astonishment at how 
unskilled at arms the indigenous people were.
3  Given a modern epidemiological 
                                                 
3 It is remarkable that European technology was not further ahead (Gunderson 1976, 30-32).  Many tribes 
made surprising progress given their limited population and physical capital, and the large 
intercontinental gap in formal education, archives, and other measurable indices of human capital.  “There 
were some obvious differences  …  .  The Indians did not develop the technology Europeans did with 
metals and that, more than anything else, accounted for the subjection of the New World to the Old” 
(Gunderson 1976, 31).  Indian “tactics—concealment and surprise, moving fire, envelopment and, when 
the enemy’s ranks were broken, hand-to-hand combat—remained the cardinal features of Native 
American warfare” and served them well during mobile encounters, especially in forests.  But though 
Indians “were able to maintain and repair firearms  …  they could not manufacture them, nor could they 
produce gunpowder.  …  [T]hey could not withstand onslaughts by European troops equipped with 
cannon.  Instead, they tended to abandon their towns and food supplies rather than to fight for them.  On 
the other hand, the lack of artillery rendered any well designed and garrisoned fort invulnerable to Indian 
attack if its defenders were not surprised.  …  [A] prolonged war required a European ally who could 
provide economic and technical assistance, and sanctuary for families driven from their homes” (Starkey 
1998, 167-68).   
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understanding Columbus would have been even more astonished at how unprepared 
American immunities were to withstand imported diseases (McNeill 1976). 
Contrast that with today’s North American tribal reservations.
4  Most American-
born progeny of the Eastern Hemisphere are well nourished, even over-nourished, and 
by definition of modern stature.  Reservation residents are notably less well nourished.  
To a remarkable degree modern medicine has controlled disease within each group, 
though reservation health lags (Putney, 1980).  Substance abuse, often associated with 
despondence, is more severe among Indians than the general population.
5  In the U.S., 
reservations cover about one-percent of the nation’s geography and those living there 
account for about one-percent of the population.  But most reservation land is located 
where land values are below the national average.  A simple upper-bound estimate 
indicates that quality-adjusted reservation land per capita is at least one-quarter below 
the average value for all land in the U.S.
6  Only for capital have tribes maintained their 
forbearers’ relative position—they still bring up the rear. 
Replicating the off-reservation setting on-reservation requires understanding 
why the tribes lost those leads they once enjoyed but failed to close gaps when they 
started behind.  That in turn requires reasoning beyond land the tribes lost—nearly all 
the world’s people (including Indians) are materially wealthier today than were their 
ancestors though land per capita has grown vastly less with human population increase.   
Even with no military discrepancy it was inevitable that a lot of land would 
change hands after 1492.  American land had relatively low marginal productivity 
because there was little indigenous labor and capital to complement it.  The Indians 
                                                 
4 The situation in much of South and Central America is even grimmer.  
 
5 “The alcohol abuse problem among American Indians/Alaska Natives appears to be concentrated in the 
young and the so-called ‘heavy drinkers’ over 26. Binge drinking rates (drinking five or more drinks on 
one occasion at least once a month) for youth 12 to 17 are highest for Native Americans (12.8 percent do 
it, versus 11.9 percent for Whites and 11 percent for Blacks).  For Native youth who practice ‘heavy 
alcohol use’ (defined as binge drinking five times a month or more), the rate 1999 to 2000 has declined 
significantly, from 4.6 percent to 2.9 percent (rates were at least twice as high a decade ago).  But after 
26, the 7.4 percent rate of heavy alcohol users is highest among Native Americans, and is increasing, 
while most other groups’ severe use rates are stable or declining.  …  For the age group 25 to 34, 
American Indian males die almost three times more frequently than their non- Indian counterparts from 
motor vehicle crashes; they are twice as likely to commit suicide; they are seven times more likely to 
suffer from alcohol-related problems, such as cirrhosis of the liver” (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 2002, 1).  “American Indians and Alaska natives are more likely to smoke than any other 
group in the United States, with 40 percent of adults defined as smokers, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention said  …  Among adults, 25 percent of blacks said they were smokers, compared with 
nearly 26 percent of whites and 26.5 percent of the population overall” (New York Times 2004) 
 
6 See Appendix.  
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were neither ignorant nor even unlucky in having land of such low marginal 
productivity—high marginal productivity of land is correlated with low marginal 
productivity of another factor (Haddock and Kiesling 2002; Haddock 2003a, 178-80; 
192).  European land, more productive per acre but less productive per capita, witnessed 
peasant poverty, even famine.  What geographically differing marginal productivities 
implied were gains from trade.  When shared, both the indigenous and immigrant 
populations benefited (Anderson and McChesney 1994). 
First hunting-and-gathering and then agriculture, both land-intensive, have 
provided humankind’s predominant employments through most of history.  That has 
changed radically in recent decades.  As with the rest of the U.S. population, most 
Indians today would be better employed in pharmacy or engineering or teaching or 
another line that is much less land intensive.  Thus to insist that tribes strive to regain 
pre-Columbian land-intensities would consign them permanently to an economic 
backwater.  It is capital rather than land that connects growing population with growing 
wealth.  But simply augmenting pecuniary tribal accounts is a stopgap policy at best.  
Income elasticity for leisure is positive, so exogenous inflows may induce simultaneous 
consumption increases, production decreases, and eccentric forms of investment—the 
so-called Spanish Curse.
7  Financial capital is the obverse of physical and (to an extent) 
technological capital, but along with human and institutional forms it is the physical and 
technological capital, not merely claims to them, that enhance the opportunities for site-
specific resources.   
So land loss per se does not account for poverty on reservations.  Tribal 
impoverishment arose from two other sources.  The one discussed through the 
remainder of this section is absence of an impartial enforcer of property rights to 
prevent military capabilities from affecting land negotiations, deleteriously for the 
Indians.  From the early-seventeenth through the late-nineteenth centuries the wealth of 
first one tribe and then another suffered a dramatic downward shock as immigrant 
traders and then settlers approached its frontier.  The typical first impact was disruption 
of tribal economies by eastern hemisphere diseases against which the indigenous 
                                                 
7 The term arises from the long-run deleterious impact on its economy of massive Spanish confiscation of 
America’s precious metals.  Spain seemed the wealthiest economy on earth while paying stolen Aztec and 
Inca gold for imports, but once that lode played out Spain found itself with a depleted domestic 
productive base.  Similar impacts are seen in some Middle Eastern oil exporting countries—consumption 
of imported goods runs high while imported labor disproportionately supplies local services (Pamuk 
2002). 
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population had no immunity.  As a result of transmission from neighboring tribes nearer 
the coast, such epidemics often preceded a tribe’s first contact with the immigrant 
population.  The perception of the immigrants was consequently that the interior was 
even more sparsely populated than it recently had been.  The already low marginal 
product of Indian land was further reduced by the devastation of the complementary 
labor resource, increasing the readiness of the survivors to part with it and decreasing 
their willingness to defend it.
8 
Contrary to casual perception, the Crown, colonies, and even private land 
dealers often paid compensation to tribes that were directly displaced as settlers moved 
in (see Johnson v. McIntosh), a policy that continued after formation of the United 
States (see County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation; Oneida Indian Nation v. New 
York).
9  But compensation was rarely paid to inland tribes when one from nearer the 
coast was induced or forced to crowd in on them, a collateral displacement that, like the 
preliminary impact of epidemics among the Indians, often went completely 
unrecognized by policy makers.  By revealed preference the compensation paid even to 
the initial movers must have been inadequate judging from frequent resistance.  As a 
result many of today’s Indians begin life shadowed by a history of puny shares of the 
gains from the land trade.   Kuwaitis make few non-financial investments because their 
permanent income was shocked upward so dramatically by oil; Indians make few 
investments of any sort because their permanent income was shocked sharply 
downward by displacement.   
The oft-told story of the Cherokee forced along the Trail of Tears illustrates.  In 
the middle of the eighteenth century the Cherokee occupied most of western Virginia 
Colony, which included today’s Kentucky and West Virginia, most of the western parts 
                                                 
8 See Haddock and Kiesling (2002) for a detailed discussion of the relevant economic theory, albeit in the 
context of the Black Death that afflicted the eastern hemisphere beginning in 1347. 
 
9 [E]ndeavor to impress the Indians with an idea of the generosity of our disposition to accommodate 
them, and with the necessity we are under, of providing for our Warriors, our Young People who are 
growing up, and strangers who are coming from other countries to live among us  …  [P]oint very 
strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians, and the propriety of purchasing 
their Lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of their Country; which as we 
have already experienced is like driving the Wild Beasts of the Forest which will return as soon as the 
pursuit is at an end and fall perhaps on those that are left there; when the gradual extension of our 
Settlements will as certainly cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being beasts of prey tho’ they 
differ in shape. 
George Washington to James Duane 
7 September 1783 
(Purcha 1990, 2) 
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of both Carolinas, including Tennessee, and north Georgia as far as Alabama (Martin 
2001).
10  During the Revolutionary War the Cherokee allied with the established 
government against the ultimately victorious rebels, and peace negotiations between the 
belligerents in 1785 resulted in the Cherokee relinquishing substantial territory and 
agreeing to become a protectorate.
11  In exchange the U.S categorically recognized the 
new border separating the two nations (Prucha 1990, 6-8).   
But in 1803 President Jefferson first raised the possibility of removing all 
eastern tribes, including the Cherokee, to land beyond the Mississippi River where 
French territorial claims had recently been transferred to the United States as a result of 
the Louisiana Purchase.  That land, of course, was already occupied by a number of 
other tribes such as the Kiowa, Osage, Kansa, Cheyenne, and Dakota.  Across more 
than two decades the Cherokee resisted removal from a shrinking redoubt centered in 
the north Georgia mountains, yielding most of their Hopewell territory via subsequent 
treaties signed under duress.  Now whites were illegally mining gold even there.   
After a major strike near Dahlonega in 1827 Georgia’s legislature declared the 
Cherokee Nation dissolved.
12  Georgia’s militia prevented the Cherokee Council from 
even convening at New Echota, their capital—they defiantly met across the Tennessee 
border instead.  The state apportioned the reservation among several counties and 
granted the land to white Land Lottery and Gold Lottery winners (Wishart and Hanson 
2003). 
Rather than going to war, the tribe went to the U.S. Supreme Court, demanding 
treaty enforcement.  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall ruled that  
If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite 
them can scarcely be imagined.  …  [But the] third article of the constitution describes 
the extent of the judicial power.  The second section closes an enumeration of the cases 
to which it is extended, with “controversies” “between a state or the citizens thereof, 
and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.”  …  Is the Cherokee nation a foreign state in 
the sense in which that term is used in the constitution?  …  [Tribes] may, more 
                                                 
10 Georgia Colony also included most of today’s Mississippi, but Chickasaw warriors kept Mississippi 
and south Alabama beyond the Cherokee range. 
 
11 Two years older than the Constitution of the United States, the Treaty of Hopewell was negotiated 
under the Articles of Confederation.  It might seem that protectorate is euphemistic—inter alia the tribe 
was “protected from” potential voluntary dealings with nations other than the U.S.—unless one 
understands that it was not the tribe but a U.S. monopoly of intercourse with the tribe that was to be 
protected. 
 
12 The Dahlonega gold rush was the nation’s largest prior to the California strike at Sutter’s Mill twenty-
one years later.  History is silent regarding the Atlanta football club’s failure to be named the Twenty-
Seveners. 
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correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.  …  [T]he framers of 
our constitution had not the Indian tribes in view, when they opened the courts of the 
union to controversies between a state  …  and foreign states.  …  If it be true that the 
Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be 
asserted.  If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be 
apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future. 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 
 
The courts would enforce no Indian treaty rights—even today a tribe must throw itself 
on the mercy of Congress for that.   
Congress had other things in mind for the Cherokee—removal to their sector of 
an Indian reserve originally envisioned as the entire column of land between the 
Missouri River in what became South Dakota and the U.S.-Mexican border at the Red 
River along the southern edge of today’s Oklahoma—after 1836 the U.S. border with 
the Republic of Texas.  The Cherokee lost the voice of their vocal champion—
Tennessee Congressman Davy Crockett headed west toward immortality at the Alamo 
after his political career was scuttled by his unpopular protest against treatment of the 
tribe—and in 1838 the U.S. Army began to force the Cherokee west.  Several thousand 
perished during removal.   
Despite the Treaty of Hopewell the U.S. recognized the Cherokee Nation within 
its ever-shrinking homeland for barely a half-century.
13  Following the Civil War 
Congress dissolved the geographical borders even of the Cherokee Nation’s Indian 
Territory reservation.  Thus, that most civilized of the Five Civilized Tribes, a tribe with 
a written language, a newspaper, courts and a constitution modeled on that of the U.S., 
was coerced into a very unfavorable land exchange, a massive diminution of tribal 
wealth.   
The Cherokee experience was part of an accelerating continent-wide process.  At 
the conclusion of the War of 1812 Britain retrenched into Canada leaving the U.S. with 
no serious competitors for alliance with interior tribes, with a predictable impact on 
subsequent treaty terms (Starkey 1998, 167-68; Wilkinson and Volkman 1975, 609).  
Thereafter the U.S. often allied with a band from one tribe against another tribe—even 
                                                 
13 A minority of the tribe evaded the Army’s sweep.  Eventually a tiny reservation was formed for them 
on ancestral land at the verge of the Smoky Mountains where their progeny remain today in and around 
the appropriately named town of Cherokee, North Carolina. 
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against another band from the same tribe
14 (Roberts 1993)—but no European nation was 
prepared to enter a serious alliance with a tribe against the United States.  A half-
century later the massive human capital and infrastructure that had been specialized to 
contesting the Civil War proved difficult to reintegrate into the post-war U.S. economy.  
For the first time the U.S. was left with a large standing army in peacetime (Anderson 
and McChesney 1994).  By decreasing the United States’ cost of fighting Indians, that 
otherwise idle force increased the plight of the tribes.  In 1871 Congress decreed that  
Hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be 
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty:  Provided, further, That nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore 
lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe.  
16 Stat. 544, 566 
 
Treaty making with Indians was at an end (Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams 1993, 
179), and on Sept. 3, 1886 the last free Indians were summarily herded into 
confinement. 
But being dragged behind does not require staying behind.  Regression-to-the-
mean is a common social process—those pushed behind (or ahead) tend to converge 
toward the mean over time, while non-systematic shocks jolt new individuals away.  For 
comparison, though African-Americans remain less wealthy than average the gap has 
continued to close since abolition.  The failure of reservation Indians to converge as 
rapidly—the second source of their impoverishment—is manmade, legal constraints on 
Indians’ management of their residual assets.  We now discuss that chronic, festering 
problem, point to subtle pitfalls that sabotage well-meaning but naïve efforts by the U.S. 
courts to rectify it, then suggest a self-help initiative that tribes could adopt that would 
make involvement of the national court system unnecessary. 
 
II. STAYING  BEHIND 
Early U.S. policy sometimes benefited Indians, as by buffering reciprocal threats 
distinct populations posed for each other, but that was incidental to an intended benefit 
for U.S. citizens.
15  Many reservations, especially in the western U.S., began as prisoner 
                                                 
14 Debo (1970, 278) claims that, except for officers, the force that inflicted the final defeat on Geronimo’s 
band consisted entirely of Apache scouts.  Though other sources contend that U.S. troopers were 
involved, mention of the significant role played by Apache scouts is ubiquitous.  For instance, see Sharp 
(2002). 
  
15 Few Indians held U.S. citizenship before passage of the Citizenship Act of 1924.   10
of war camps confining entire populations, young and old, male and female.  Before 
firing a single shot the Nez Perce tragically discovered that refusing to vacate ones 
homeland for some unfamiliar locale, then, resistance having failed, trying to emigrate 
peaceably to an allied tribe’s reservation or to Canada as preferred alternatives would 
make an enemy of the U.S.  A few Nez Perce children who saw their people lend crucial 
aid to Lewis and Clark during the fall of 1805 and again in the spring of 1806 were 
poorly repaid as elders in 1877, forced to abandon their homeland to gold miners and 
settlers (Debo 1970, 101-02, 261-64; Ambrose 1996, 292-301, 353-70; Greene 2000).  
Eventually bureaucratic drive for uniformity led even those tribes who have never 
fought against the U.S. to be treated in much the same way (United States v. Sandoval).   
From there popular perception of tribal reservations gradually eroded from a 
slanderous, nightmarish vision of concentration camps for dangerous and cunning foes 
capable of almost anything to an even less complimentary one of wasted ghettos for the 
lethargic and apathetic underemployed capable of almost nothing.  Both visions have 
motivated policy that has been injurious to Indians, the former through actions that 
closely confined Indians geographically, the latter through policies that continue even 
now to limit Indians’ economic decisionmaking as though they are mental 
incompetents.  Anachronistic constraints on resource utilization translate into poor 
incentives for investment in physical, human, technological, or institutional capital, as 
reflected by abrupt differences between encumbered and adjacent unencumbered land 
(Anderson and Lueck 1992).  A proud and energetic people have been brought low. 
Careful observers distinguish top-down policies from bottom-up institutions.   
Bottom-up institutions arise organically when people learn to deal with whatever 
problems and incentives they themselves face on a day-to-day basis.  Though unlikely 
to be perfect, such institutions have a close association with the matters addressed and 
thus with common life.
16  Top-down policies originate in the mind of authorities who 
use the policies to govern the lives of others.  Sometimes that seems the only way to 
attack some problem.  But policy makers may be remote, have private interests that are 
largely or totally unaffected by their policies, and be shielded from or indifferent to 
reverse information flows regarding policy impacts.  Then there is little reason to expect 
the policies to improve common life, though they may interfere with initiatives that 
                                                                                                                                               
 
16 Perfect (albeit hypothetical) institutions are called Nirvana efficient, while optimal institutions merely 
beat realistic alternatives (Demsetz 1969). 
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would.  Indeed policy makers sometimes have private interests that run counter to what 
would appear to the public to be their obligations, and then there is good reason to 
expect policies that degrade common life (McChesney 1990; 1997).   
Much like our present Iraq policy, U.S. Indian policies are top-down manifests 
issuing from geographically remote bureaucrats whose private interests lie elsewhere, 
and who often seem quite insulated from information regarding policy failures at ground 
zero.  On-going litigation hints that many bureaucrats employed by the main trustee of 
Indian resources, the Interior Department’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), hardly 
care.
17   
One need not even reach the question of whether Indian forbearers deserved to 
be treated as POWs or were incapable of coping with a modern world into which they 
had unceremoniously been thrust.  That happened generations ago, a period that has 
proven easily adequate for Norway (as just one example) to transform itself from an 
impoverished land of semi-literate peasants into one of the most modern of nations.  
Though they have little desire to lose their tribal identity, Indians who continue to reside 
on reservations despite the manifest economic hardships would like to be placed on a 
comparable legal footing with their fellow citizens.   
How might a transition be made that preserves distinct Indian cultures and treaty 
entitlements?  One of the most promising routes would unfetter individual Indians 
where purely personal affairs are concerned by removing the BIA as trustee over 
individual entitlements, a transfer accompanied by limited constraints on asset 
                                                 
17 “U.S. District Judge Royce C. Lamberth  …  is presiding over a lawsuit filed five years ago [now 
nearly eight] by [Blackfeet] Indians who contend they are owed up to $10 billion because of chronic 
accounting failures [by the BIA].  He ordered the Interior Department to repair the system in a December 
1999 ruling that detailed a history of incompetence and neglect.  …  At a hearing [two years later], 
Lamberth said it wasn't clear to him who was even in charge of trust reform efforts.  …  [The then 
Secretary of the Interior] Babbitt launched his own reorganization in 1999  …  .  Despite those efforts, the 
Interior Department still can't provide an accurate accounting of trust assets for account-holders.  …  [The 
subsequent Secretary of the Interior] Norton's plan, which came after a management consultant's study, 
takes the BIA out of trust fund management and shifts those duties to [a] new office.  But many of the 
BIA employees now involved  …  will move to the new office, Norton said.  …  [A] lawyer for the 
Indians, likened the planned changes to ‘rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic’" (Miller 2001).  See 
Cobell v. Norton.  Unfortunately, Indian asset mismanagement is not the great aberration that has been 
exposed by this case—that the media have only recently become intently interested in what has since the 
1800s been gross mismanagement is the greater aberration.  The Soviet Union could well and truly have 
been characterized as a new and improved model of the U.S. bureaucracy that has handled Indian affairs 
since the nineteenth century. 
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alienability if the tribe decided by vote that such a policy would protect their culture.
18  
Unfortunately that route has barely been exploited.  A mutually compatible route would 
devolve governance over local matters to tribes, though care must be taken that the 
tribal government is truly representative of individual Indians.  Some movement has 
occurred along that line as Congress and the courts gradually strengthen the sovereignty 
of tribal governments.
19   
 
III. Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is an ambiguous term, two incisive definitions being “supreme in 
power; superior in position to all others” and less grandly “independent of, and 
unlimited by, any other; possessing  …  original and independent authority” (Webster 
1960).  Analogously, a sovereign can mean “chief of state” or “[s]elf-governing, 
independent” (American Heritage 1976).  Supreme in power and chief of state clearly 
imply a government-subject relationship.  But while self-governing, independent of, and 
unlimited by any other precludes any higher authority, it is silent regarding subordinate 
ones, and might apply to an individual living in anarchy.  Thus the one meaning implies 
a sovereign who can demand allegiance from somebody, but the alternative requires 
only that nobody can demand subservience from a sovereign. 
Sovereigns of the former type certainly existed in some pre-contact locales.  As 
in the Eastern Hemisphere at the same time, Mayan princes boastfully recorded wars 
they won as well as the frequently dreadful aftermath.  At first contact the Aztec and 
Inca ruled states of a sort very familiar to Europeans.  Indeed, Inca is not the name of a 
                                                 
18 Removing the BIA as trustee for individual entitlements could hardly fail to improve asset 
management.  That being accomplished, the tribe might then vote, for instance, to permit alienation of 
each member’s land only to another member of the tribe (McChesney 1990).  If excluding some potential 
purchasers decreased land value, a tribal majority and not the BIA would have decided that the subjective 
benefit exceeded the objective cost.  But if tribal culture is a valuable amenity attaching to the land, the 
restriction would increase the value to members of any given plot.  It is an empirical question which of 
those influences would dominate and thus whether reservation land would sell for more or for less.  On 
Canadian reserves Indian residents who hold Certificates of Possession are indeed permitted to alienate 
their rights only to other members of the tribe (Flanagan and Alcantara 20xx).  The restriction of 
alienation on those reserves, however, seems to be required by Canadian law rather than being an option 
that a willing tribe may select if it chooses.  On efficient treatment of an amenity that affects site value see 
Haddock (2003b).   
 
19 Some consider the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 to be a major benchmark in the growth of tribal 
sovereignty, though others point to the resulting stubborn increase in BIA intrusion into tribal affairs 
(McChesney 1990).  One might instead date the process from 1959 when Williams v. Lee was handed 
down, or even from the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act of 1975 (88 Stat. 2203). 
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tribe or language as is commonly supposed—a proper Quechuan translation is king or 
emperor.
20  As Conquistadors arrived in South America one Inca governed a northern 
empire from a capital at Quito while another governed the southern part from Cuzco.  In 
the more densely populated parts of what became the United States pre-contact 
hierarchical structures with governmental authority over subjects also had evolved, 
perhaps the most widely-remembered being the Haudenosaunee (or Iroquois) 
Confederacy.
21 
But tribe implies a group of people sharing a language and culture, with or 
without a government (Anderson 1995), and sometimes the latter definition of 
sovereignty—independent, self-governing individuals unlimited by any other—would 
have been appropriate.  The Europeans often focused entreaties on some persuasive 
Indian capable frequently of convincing a number of fellows to cooperate in various 
undertakings, but in many tribes no person or assembly was considered by members to 
wield institutionalized coercive authority over dissenters.   
The Chiricahua for instance “had no formal leader such as a tribal chief, or 
council, nor a decision making process.  The core of the band was  …  predominantly, 
but not necessarily, kinsmen” (Crystal 2003).  Cochise led a band of at-will volunteers, 
not a troop of conscripts.  Formerly allied Apaches sometimes made war on each other 
while erstwhile enemies might ally against a common foe (Roberts1993).   The Lewis 
and Clark Expedition inadvertently sparked antagonism when they inferred that the 
apparent leader of one small Nez Perce band was a paramount chief with sway over 
another small band (Ambrose 1996, 361-62).  That is reminiscent of saga era Iceland 
(Njal’s Saga 2001; Friedman 1979) and Norway (Egil’s Saga 1975) or today’s Kung 
(Marshall 1959), not of government.   As with the individual sovereignty of consumers, 
those people were individual political sovereigns, but hardly governments.   
                                                 
20 Analogous usage would have one calling all Russians Czars, or all the Zulu Impi.  Both the Aztec and 
the Inca (and the Czars and Impi for that matter) ruled states rather than tribes in that in each instance 
peoples of several languages and cultures had been incorporated under central authority.   
 
21 The Confederacy formed either in 1142 or 1451, either date pre-Columbian.  The three century plus 
margin of error arises from oral tradition that the Seneca, the last of the pre-contact members to join, 
became persuaded to adopt the Great Law of Peace when a solar eclipse interrupted a tense afternoon of 
negotiation at a known site.  A total eclipse would have occurred there on August 31, 1142 and a 
substantial but partial eclipse on June 28, 1451.  It is clear from European records that a Haudenosaunee 
government functioned in the early 1500s at first contact.  The Confederacy still spans the New York-
Ontario border, consisting of the pre-contact member tribes—Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and 
Seneca—as well as the Tuscarora who joined circa 1700 (Mann & Fields 1997; Johansen 1995).   
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Once rare, governments had engulfed Europe by 1492, so throughout our 
colonial and national history the Crown, Congress, and the courts have analogized tribes 
to those institutions with which they were familiar.  With the Apache as with the 
Iroquois, some sort of governmental tribal council has been assumed and tribal 
members have been taken to be bound by council decisions and to shoulder whatever 
burdens result.  Such a government’s power can be enhanced via distinct routes that are 
different in important ways—at the expense of the national government, at the expense 
of the government of the state or states that overlap the tribe geographically, or at the 
expense of private parties—whether Indian or non-Indian—who have or might form 
interests on the reservation.  Increasing any sovereign power may well afford benefits 
but will surely impose costs, and thus may either appreciate or depreciate the 
circumstances that face citizens (Barzel 1992; Haddock and Hall 1983; Haddock 1998).  
When permitted by courts, a wise and benevolent government would seek to exploit its 
sovereign power if and when benefits exceed costs, and to control the costs of all forms.  
The several facets of sovereignty remain blurred unless one distinguishes non-
consensual constraints that were imposed on sovereigns by more powerful ones from 
constraints that a sovereign or subject assumes willingly in order to draw corresponding 
commitments (i.e., constraints on the sovereignty of the other).  Every tribe could point 
to past inequities to rationalize policies that disappoint particular individuals.  But that is 
hazardous with consensual interactions, where cooperation will be rare if unprincipled 
tribal sovereignty is feared.  An investor who simply forgoes on-reservation 
opportunities avoids tribal policy easily and at low cost though substantial opportunity 
costs are thus imposed on residents holding site-specific complementary resources.   
Emerging tribes endeavoring to form good reputations can more easily calm investor 
fear if courts, both tribal and federal, will help insure the ex post veracity of ex ante 
tribal proclamations, as courts do for other citizens.  Profligate use of a first mover’s 
power more easily injures other tribes than investors.  If courts neglect that danger they 
could trap some tribes in a prisoner’s dilemma where the best choice becomes prompt 
over-exploitation of tribal power (Haddock 1994).  Just a few bad examples might 
easily convince many potential investors that all tribes are untrustworthy. 
Yielding sovereignty implies increasing constraints in one of several distinct 
ways.  (1) For instance, when William the Conqueror seized power from King Harold 
dominion was gained by the one and ipso facto lost by the other.  Harold would have 
been displeased by the expectation and (had he survived) by its realization, wishing that   15
someone could halt William’s incursion at Hastings.  (2) William, hoping to retain the 
loyalty of his Norman lieutenants, granted them limited sovereignty over parts of his 
new realm by disenfranchising Saxon lords.  The newly created Norman lords were 
sovereign over their serfs and the lesser nobles below them in the feudal estate, but at 
the same time subjects of William.  William expected both he and his lieutenants would 
be advantaged.  But the displaced Saxons must surely have rued the day both ex ante 
and  ex post, wishing that some still higher authority had forbidden William’s 
expropriations.  (3) Saxon peasants limited their future options in exchange for Norman 
or Saxon merchants limiting their present options, as by obtaining food during famine 
with an offer to repay with interest once yields recovered.  Survivors would be 
advantaged ex post by avoiding repayment, but in sharp distinction to the two earlier 
examples disadvantaged ex ante were that anticipated, for then merchants would 
predictably provision only those who could pay spot prices.  Merchant injury would be 
reduced if provisions could be sold where no similar threat existed.  Every famished 
peasant would ardently vow to repay, but after the famine had passed an unscrupulous 
peasant’s incentive would be to disavow the promise.  The peasants’ loss of sovereignty 
would be beneficial ex ante—their problem would be making it credible so as to avoid 
starvation.  
With respect to tribal governments, analogues are (1) unilateral extension of 
authority over Indians by the United States government, (2) delegation of a part of that 
authority to state governments, and (3) tribal members or governments dealings with 
investors, whether Indian or not.  There is reason to think that tribes were disadvantaged 
by involuntarily yielding sovereignty to the U.S. and might benefit by recapturing it.  
State governments typically exchange little if anything, at least directly, for the limited 
sovereignty over the tribes that is granted them by the national government.  Tribes 
might benefit by recapturing that.  But non-fraudulent voluntary agreements between a 
tribe and either a private party or a state are mutually beneficial ex ante.  If the long-run 
injury could be confined to untrustworthy tribes and those foolish enough to contract 
with them, opportunistic interference would be of minor importance.  But federal Indian 
law is a unified whole, investors have difficulty distinguishing among tribes, and thus 
un-textured deference to Indian sovereignty diminishes credible tribes’ reputations as 
well.   
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A. Sovereignty Recaptured From the U.S. 
If sovereignty is taken to mean independent of and unlimited by any other, no 
Indians inside U.S. borders have been completely sovereign since Geronimo’s 
dwindling band surrendered in 1886.  Like that of William’s lieutenants, tribal 
sovereignty is conditional, whatever the U.S. is prepared to recognize at the moment.  In 
1831 the Supreme Court characterized tribes not as sovereign nations but as “domestic 
dependent nations” (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia).  As governments they were and are 
able to deal directly with the national government, but certainly not as equals.  And they 
can deal directly and bindingly with any other individual or government—state or 
foreign—only if and when authorized to do so by the national government.    
From Cherokee Nation v. Georgia the tribes’ plight actually increased.   
The contention [that Congress could not divest tribal lands in violation of treaty terms] 
in effect ignores the status of the contracting Indians and the relation of dependency that 
they bore and continue to bear towards the government of the United States.  To uphold 
the claim would be to adjudge that the indirect operation of the treaty was to materially 
limit and qualify the controlling authority of Congress  …  and to deprive Congress  …  
of all power to act, if the assent of the Indians could not be obtained. 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock 
 
Popular perception is that treaties do indeed “materially limit and qualify the controlling 
authority of” the signatories.  Inter-sovereign dealings often lack an impartial third-party 
enforcer and as a result ultimately rely on credible threats (Umbeck 1981; Haddock 
2003a, 180), but such bald-faced acknowledgment never facilitates treaty negotiations. 
A transfer of sovereignty from the United States might well benefit tribes.  But 
to the extent it may seem from time to time to occur it is a mere, readily-withdrawn 
delegation of authority—sometimes the U.S. government chooses not to intervene in 
tribal affairs, but it always can.  In that sense the tribes are older but nonetheless lesser 
sovereigns than states.  Though the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause permits the 
national government to set aside a great deal of state law there remain reserved rights 
that protect state action in the absence of a constitutional amendment.  Lone Wolf, in 
contrast, grants the national government extraordinary discretion unilaterally to frustrate 
tribal decisions.   
 
B. Sovereignty Recaptured From States 
State sovereignty over tribes would seem a more promising target for the tribes, 
given the U.S. government’s availability as third-party enforcer.  A few reservations are   17
more easily measured in acres than square miles, and it seems unlikely that their 
sovereignty could be completely disentangled from that of the surrounding state.  But at 
the other extreme sixteen reservations are larger than Rhode Island, ten of them larger 
than the Canadian province of Prince Edward Island, eight larger than Delaware.  The 
largest reservation, Navajo, approaches New Brunswick’s area, is virtually the size of 
West Virginia, somewhat larger than Nova Scotia, and well over twice the size of any 
New England state other than Maine.  Just as it has long been possible for all those 
states and provinces to govern themselves rather than lean on geographically larger 
neighbors, it seems at least plausible that large reservations could similarly stand 
completely apart from states if U.S. trust authority over Indians were terminated.   
In fact, most reservations predate the states that were layered atop them.  States 
attain sovereignty over tribes only to the extent the Congress transfers it to them and 
retain it only so long as it is not rescinded—the legal default remains that tribes are 
senior to states.  When Congress or courts override the default, empowering both tribe 
and state independently to regulate or tax a reservation activity, a successive monopoly 
problem becomes a threat.  Removing either authority of either the state or the tribe 
should lower burdens on individuals but actually increase aggregate regulatory benefit 
or tax revenue (Machlup and Taber 1960).  An alternative is for the U.S. to require 
those two lesser sovereigns to negotiate with each other, but as tribal gaming illustrates 
that can lead to substantial rent-seeking dissipation (Johnson 20xx). 
With a casino in San Diego County where state law prohibits most gambling, the 
Barona Reservation’s median annual household income now exceeds $100,000, two and 
one-third times the national average.
22  Just off the Boston-New York City interstate in 
eastern Connecticut, receipts from Foxwoods, the world's largest casino, enable the 
Mashantucket Pequot to send all tribal children to private school, one the Pequot saved 
from insolvency.
23  But most reservations, frequently the most impoverished, are remote 
with few passers-by.  Consequently less than one-third participate in gambling.   
For the majority of tribal governments that do run gambling facilities, the revenues have 
been modest  …  .  The 20 largest Indian gambling facilities account for 50.5 percent of 
                                                 
22 Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth (1981) and California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) are 
important early cases concerning tribal ability to operate a reservation gaming establishment with less 
stringent operating limits than are exercised by the surrounding state.  Congress quickly acted to affirm 
those court initiatives, with substantial modification, through the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1166 et seq.; 25 U.S.C. §§ 2107 et seq.). 
 
23 {{Track down NYTimes article, or obtain updated info directly from the tribe.}} 
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total revenues with the next 85 accounting for [only] 41.2 percent.  Additionally, not all 
gambling facilities are successful.  Some tribes operate their casinos at a loss and a few 
have even been forced to close money-losing facilities. 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report, 2-10 
 
Moreover, states increasingly are threatening to license competing operations in order to 
extract side payments from the tribe (Johnson 20xx).  A once thriving tribal enterprise 
may find survival increasingly difficult as a result.  Beyond question, gaming has 
proven lucrative for a few tribes, but the bounty is quixotic.  Tribes that by pure luck are 
well situated enjoy very attractive returns while their unlucky brethren languish in 
poverty.  Though ameliorating reservation poverty in individual locales, tribal gambling 
establishments comprise no panacea. 
Much of the rest of the tribe-state record is similarly discouraging.  A Court that 
typically loves competition among private enterprises is skeptical of competition among 
political enterprises.  Thus Washington v. Confederated Tribes held that activities on a 
reservation would be subject to state taxation if a substantial part of the business was 
motivated by customers’ intention to evade the state levy.  A state cannot tax a 
transaction if the reservation-based enterprise can reliably (but expensively) document 
that the customer is a tribe member.   
Thus the Court has outlined an Orwellian form of sovereignty—all sovereigns 
are equal but some are more equal than others.  There is little question that, by bearing 
the cost of doing so, Indiana can tax liquor brought into the state for local consumption.  
But imagine the Court informing Illinois that Indiana could tax the entire Illinois retail 
liquor sector except for those parts that, at substantial cost, Illinois documented were not 
sold to Hoosiers.  Imagine the Court informing North Carolina that New York could tax 
all its tobacco sales in an analogous way.  The Court’s reasoning is distinct only in 
viewing reservations as a part of states that were layered atop them rather than as the 
more usual default—holes in the states’ sovereignty.  The import of Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes is that both a reservation and a state can tax a lot of on-reservation 
sales while only the state can tax off-reservation sales.  Single-taxed liquor stores and 
bars thrive along one side of many reservation borders while double-taxed smoke shops 
along the opposite side fail.
24 
                                                 
24 Belluck (2003) reports on one of a number of recent tribe-state encounters regarding a state’s ability to 
tax sales made on reservations.  
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Vacillating policy means that even tribal sovereignty retrieved from the states, as 
in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, may quickly be lost, as through Cotton Petroleum v. New 
Mexico.  The cases were similar in that each plaintiff challenged a state’s ability to tax 
mineral production on tribal reservations.  In 1924 Congress permitted 
nondiscriminatory state taxes on royalties from minerals withdrawn from reservations, 
but did that power to tax survive subsequent legislation that streamlined leasing of tribal 
minerals though completely silent regarding state taxes?  The Supreme Court's Canons 
of Construction of Indian Law require that “ambiguous expressions must be resolved in 
favor of the Indian  …  and Indian treaties must be liberally construed in [their] favor” 
(Wilkinson and Volkman 1975, 617).  In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe the Court decided 
the state taxing power could not survive the Canons and thus a state could not tax tribal 
royalties unless and until Congress reinvigorated the authorization.  Sovereignty 
regained.  
Could states tax mineral extraction companies making those severances?  In 
Cotton Petroleum the Court held that the reservation hole in state sovereignty was too 
shallow to shield the companies, who were thus simultaneously subject to both 
sovereigns.  Assuming that states, tribes, companies, and consumers—everyone that is 
except courts—are interested in average revenue paid and received and the level of 
output rather than in filamentary legal distinctions, then rudimentary economic theory 
seems to imply that Cotton Petroleum simply unraveled Blackfeet Tribe.  Each case 
dealt with the distribution between state and tribe of returns from leasing Indian’s 
mineral rights, but the cases reached diametrically opposing outcomes—Blackfeet Tribe 
implied that states were entitled to no share of economic rents from tribal minerals; 
Cotton Petroleum implied that by using an intermediary the states can tax at whatever 
rate they decide would maximize state revenue.  Sovereignty relost.  
That model may be unduly optimistic.  Throughout the United States, 
specialized companies undertake nearly all mineral extraction, hinting that other forms 
of organization are more costly.  Drilling on government land utilizes specialized 
private companies.  Ranchers do not drill their own water wells, much less oil wells; 
specialized companies do.  A tribe-owned company, however, is exempt from state 
taxes.  The incoherence of the cases could result in small-scale and inefficient tribe-
owned extractors (Haddock 2002).  Every cent of tax a tribe saved would be a cent that 
a state would not receive, merely a transfer rather than an economic gain, while the   20
mineral withdrawals would become more costly than withdrawals beyond reservation 
borders, a waste.  
 
C. Sovereignty Over Voluntary Relationships 
Truth is stranger than fiction  …  Fiction is obliged to stick to possibilities. 
Mark Twain (1897, ch. 15) 
  
A derisively dismissed fictional account would be greeted with gape-mouthed 
wonder if gleaned instead from the media or a court record.  Events transpiring more or 
less as usual are not news.  News must be extraordinary, from a distribution’s tails, the 
most remarkable aspects of the most remarkably bad or good events.  The many normal 
events that must comprise the bulk of a credible work of fiction are by their nature 
unremarkable and thus unremarked by the media.  The legal record censors data even 
more severely—social arrangements that work remarkably well are rarely litigated but 
may be news.  Thus things can seem bizarrely risky on a reservation because outsiders 
ordinarily learn only of aberrational features of a few aberrational happenings, not the 
many humdrum events that fill out daily reservation life.   
But whether or not perceptions are thus unfairly biased against reservations, 
those perceptions form the environment within which a tribe must seek capital.   
Indisputably, given enough time a tribe can invest in its reputational capital.  But in the 
meantime many potential investors can afford little research to distinguish among tribes.  
To them a tribe is a tribe is a tribe.  Thus one tribe’s investment in reputation benefits 
hundreds of other tribes, while the cost of another’s opportunism spreads across 
hundreds.  Hence the prisoner’s dilemma—if all others invest in reputation, a given 
tribe’s most lucrative decision may be to behave opportunistically due to the diluted 
impact on its own reputation; if no other tribes invest in reputation, the demanded risk 
premium will be daunting in any case.  So a tribe may elect to take what it has paid for, 
defiling all other tribes’ reputations before they have an opportunity to execute the 
reverse tactic.  The judiciary could help defeat that dilemma. 
The diversity that might permit a litigant to remove a case to federal court for 
trial is often useless in cases contesting Indian rights, where remedies at tribal law must 
often be exhausted before a federal appeal can be lodged.  An appellate court readily 
reverses errors of law but is far more deferential toward trial court findings of fact.  In 
common parlance that means that the trial court’s findings do not have to be airtight,   21
merely supported by substantial evidence though there may be other evidence pointing 
in the opposite direction.  Then litigants will be assumed to have behaved as the trial 
court perceived, though the appellate court will overrule if the trial court erroneously 
held that a losing party had no right to behave that way, or that a winning party did have 
the right to behave as found.  If crucial facts have not been found at all the appellate 
court typically will not find them, but will remand the case to the trial court for further 
findings of fact.  Thus the motivating behavior is rarely an issue on appeal, only its 
damnability.   
Thus tribes are left on the horns of a dilemma: (1) Given the issue and tribe, 
some tribal courts apply law based on tribal customs and thus unpredictable to non-
Indian investors.
25  Admittedly, after exhausting tribal remedies a litigant may 
sometimes successfully challenge that court’s jurisdiction.  Then, depending on subject 
matter jurisdiction the case essentially begins anew in federal district or state court.  
Courts may treat litigation—in this instance duplicative litigation—and lost time as 
costless, but investors do not.  (2) Due both to animus and statistical discrimination 
there is a long history of jury, even judicial, bias against Indians in state courts, 
especially pronounced in states with large Indian populations.
26  Thus, due to a fear of 
bias, individual Indians and tribes hesitate to form agreements that potentially will 
require them to litigate before state courts while non-Indian investors resist agreements 
that may require them to litigate a case under an unfamiliar tribal law.   
A widened range of disputes that require exhaustion of tribal remedies mitigates 
Indians’ fear of state courts but exacerbates non-Indians’ fear of tribal courts.  When 
litigating outside their reservation Absaroka litigants were long required to employ an 
unfamiliar English tongue.  Though the federal court refused to permit it, many would 
think it only fair if a railroad were expected to litigate on the reservation before a judge 
                                                 
25 In some cases the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause supplants tribal with federal or even state law, and 
when there is no tribal law on point some tribes permit their courts to adopt federal law, the law of other 
tribes, or occasionally state law.  Nonetheless the “Supreme Court’s mandate to lower federal courts to 
defer to tribal courts for initial resolution of most reservation disputes has placed increased responsibility 
on tribal courts  …  [that] must compete for limited resources with other vitally necessary tribal programs  
…  There is a widespread feeling held by many non-Indians that tribal judges are biased against them.  
There are also complaints of incompetence, and even corruption in some tribal courts.  Tribal traditions of 
deference to the consensus-building process within the tribe may constrain the process of judicial review 
of executive and legislative branch actions” (Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams 1993, 522).     
 
26 {@@Complete the quote and citation from S Ct from about 1896? that "often the deadliest enemies 
of Indian tribes are the inhabitants of the states where they are located."}  
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speaking Absaroka (citation).  But a tribe cannot deposit fair in the bank.  Non-Indians 
will barely notice if the Absaroka refuse to come off their reservation, but the Absaroka 
cannot help but recognize that many non-Indian investors refuse to come onto it.   
In recognition, many tribes endeavor to meet high ethical standards.
27  Making 
that known to investors, however, is a long, tedious, expensive process, and even those 
laudable efforts by individual tribes are thwarted if an opportunistic renegade chooses to 
make a quick strike, enriching itself while sullying the reputations of Indians as a group.   
As with states or the nation itself, tribal governments can only be sued after 
clearly and expressly waiving sovereign immunity (unless Congress has waived it for 
them).  That demonstrably stops few private parties from dealing with state and national 
governments, but investors find a larger legal record in those venues and thus find it 
easier to evaluate the sovereign’s reputation (Haddock 1994).  Moreover, though every 
state can borrow from private lenders even on those occasions when it refuses to waive 
its immunity, due to their poor record some states are regarded as more risky than others 
and as a consequence pay higher risk premiums.  The matter thus is not merely whether 
a tribe can attract investment capital but also the terms under which they can attract it.  
Exacerbating their problem, tribal governments face strenuous constraints as a 
result of their trust relationship with the United States, often leaving them powerless to 
endow reservation assets to individual members.  So regardless of the preferences of its 
members or the tribal government itself, a tribe typically owns or controls most 
reservation land, natural resources, and business.  Most reservation enterprise is in 
consequence unavoidably controlled by an entity with sovereign immunity, and that 
naturally invites inordinate investor scrutiny.  And unlike states or the U.S., which can 
adopt general class-wide waivers to attract investors who may be unknown to them in 
advance, individualized process is required for waivers that affect trust property as the 
U.S. is the legal owner, the tribe or individual being merely the beneficial owner.  Thus 
BIA approval must be sought (and potentially refused) after an investor has incurred the 
cost of negotiating a contract.  Investors will assume the risk that the BIA may frustrate 
their costly negotiations with the tribe only when the expected payout is enhanced.   
Though it may place them under the oversight of a potentially hostile state court, 
most tribes will waive their immunity if a proposal promises sufficient return, though 
projects that offer marginal positive benefits are more likely to go forward off the 
                                                 
27 See the discussion in Haddock and Miller (2004) regarding the Mississippi band of Choctaw Indians. 
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reservation than on it.
28  For instance, to reassure a public at risk of injury in their 
casinos, resorts, and such, many tribes have adopted tort claims acts mandating 
procedural limitations similar to those of states and the U.S.  Some tribal governments 
have contracted to provide members with services formerly coming from the U.S. 
government.  Congress has provided that the employees of those undertakings are to be 
treated as though they were U.S. employees, with injured persons having a remedy 
against the U.S. government in federal court.  Many tribes carry liability insurance and 
expressly waive immunity with respect to their carriers. 
Carefully drawn arbitration clauses in contracts have successfully waived tribal 
sovereign immunity, as in C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe.   The Potawatomi and C & L contracted for construction of a tribal commercial 
building to be located out of Indian country.  The contractual language did not mention 
sovereign immunity at all, but the Court held unanimously that a waiver was clear due 
to two provisions.  First, "[a]ll . . . disputes . . . shall be decided by arbitration in 
accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association. . . . The award rendered by the arbitrator . . . shall be final, and 
judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having 
jurisdiction thereof."  Second, a choice-of-law clause that read: "The contract shall be 
governed by the law of the place where the Project is located."   
On the other side of the ledger, however, one finds immunity nightmares.   
Pursuant to a management agreement, in 1990 Tamiami Partners, Ltd. (TPL) invested 
six and a half million dollars to buy land for the Miccosukee Tribe and to construct a 
bingo hall.  Disputes arose, and the Miccosukee soon filed suit in tribal court.  TPL 
immediately filed a federal lawsuit to enforce the agreement’s arbitration clause and to 
enjoin the Miccosukee from taking control of the operation.  The federal court ruled that 
the Miccosukee had waived sovereign immunity by agreeing to arbitration, but stayed 
its proceedings until TPL exhausted its tribal court remedies.  The Miccosukee appealed 
to the Eleventh Circuit, which ruled there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction 
(Tamiami Partners  v. Miccosukee Tribe I 1993).   
TPL then filed a new complaint.  The federal trial court concluded that it had 
subject matter jurisdiction but that sovereign immunity barred TPL’s suit against the 
                                                 
28 Though studying United States rail history rather than the history of Indian reservations, an exhaustive 
empirical study by Fogel (1964) led to the conclusion that dependable economic progress more likely 
arises from a multitude of unimpressive projects than from a few individually impressive ones. 
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Miccosukee, the tribal business council, and the tribal gaming agency, but not against 
individual defendants.  All parties appealed (Tamiami Partners  v. Miccosukee Tribe II 
1995).  The appellate court agreed that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over three of TPL’s new claims but the management agreement waived immunity only 
to suits regarding arbitration, defeating TPL’s breach of contract claim.  TPL’s claim 
against individual tribal officers was permitted to proceed—prospective injunctive relief 
can be had against a government official to prevent violations of law (Ex Parte Young).   
But after four years of further litigation the Eleventh Circuit found the second 
amended complaint to be “a thinly-disguised attempt . . . to obtain specific performance 
of the Tribe’s obligations” by suing individual defendants.  Since the suit was thus 
construed to actually be against the Miccosukee, sovereign immunity protected the 
individuals (Tamiami Partners  v. Miccosukee Tribe III 1999, 1225-26).  The court 
remanded the case again for trial on the arbitration issues.  After more than ten years, 
the reach of tribal immunity rather than fact was still being litigated in 2002.   
Whichever party ultimately does win, TPL undoubtedly regrets having become 
involved with the Miccosukee; whichever party should win, widely reported news of the 
litigation must trouble anyone contemplating new investments on a reservation, not just 
that of the Miccosukee.  Few people have direct knowledge of the merits of the dispute, 
nor could they until the case proper can surmount seemingly endless procedural hurdles.  
What investors do understand only too well is that issues that have led TPL to 
seemingly interminable litigation with an Indian tribe would have been irrelevant had 
they contracted instead with a private party at a location off any reservation. 
Political upheaval can also upset investor projections.  The Rosebud Sioux and 
Sun Prairie negotiated a lease to place pork production facilities on tribal lands in order 
to employ members (Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt).
29  Construction commenced 
within five days of a BIA lease approval after its determination that the operation would 
have no significant environmental impact.  Environmental groups promptly brought 
suit.  The Assistant Secretary of Interior for the BIA voided the lease, claiming that the 
BIA—not Sun Prairie—had failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy 
Act.   
Acting in unison, the Sioux and Sun Prairie sued, winning a permanent 
injunction restraining the BIA from interfering with construction or operation of the 
                                                 
29 A number of similar examples are discussed in Haddock and Miller (2004). 
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project.  As the BIA appealed, a tribal referendum was narrowly decided against the 
project and a newly elected tribal council voted to support the BIA.  Though no issues 
of fact were decided the court then held that Sun Prairie alone could not contest the 
BIA’s lease invalidation, dismissed its complaint, and lifted the injunction.  Thus, a 
tribal election occurring after the contract was signed doomed Sun Prairie’s chances 
even to litigate the case.  The tribal council then asked the BIA to close completed 
facilities that had cost Sun Prairie roughly twenty million dollars to construct.   
Unsurprisingly, Sun Prairie continues to litigate.    
Politically motivated diminution of property rights deleteriously affects the 
investment climate on reservations.  Perhaps investment could be had more easily if 
tribes adopted a constitutional provision such as that of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. 
Const. Art I, § 10) that bars government alteration of vested contractual rights.  
 
D. Self Help: Mightn’t A Good Tribe Seal of Approval Help? 
A far-sighted sovereign has an incentive to form a reputation that shows that 
investors within its realm will not find the returns from their investments confiscated or 
destroyed through the sovereign’s opportunism or capriciousness.  Such a reputation 
arises most directly from a history of observed court successes by aggrieved co-
investors when their suits against the sovereign are meritorious.  But being small and 
poor with relatively few investment opportunities, many tribal reservations possess thin 
legal histories on point.  Tribal sovereigns could instead rely on a stronger sovereign to 
bond their good behavior.  But as the plight of Tamiami Partners and Sun Prairie 
illustrated above, investors might well doubt that federal courts dependably provide that 
bond.  How then might a tribe avoid paying investors high risk-premiums, resorting to 
costly tribal ownership, and foregoing some opportunities altogether?  Perhaps simply 
by making the federal and state court systems largely extraneous in the view of potential 
investors. 
A tribe intent on acting as a reliable sovereign could, in effect, magnify its 
reputation by forming a group of like-minded tribes.  The group members would 
commit to bring disputes before a pre-designated arbitrator under a limited number of   26
well-specified options regarding sovereign waivers of immunity.
30  A member selecting 
an option that waived more immunity for a particular undertaking could expect to pay 
investors lower risk premiums while one opting to waive less would of course pay 
more.  Stated differently, investors would willingly undertake more marginal projects in 
the realms of tribes willing to waive more of their sovereign immunity in arbitration.  
Ideally the options would be formulated with explicit textual discussion that made the 
intent quite transparent to the investors and the arbitrator.  The group of tribes 
collectively could bond commitments by individual member tribes by agreeing to hold a 
portion of each tribe’s assets within the jurisdictions of other members.
31 
Suppose that a member tribe refused to abide by an arbitrator’s decision, forcing 
the matter into court.  As discussed above, C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe demonstrated that at least some arbitration commitments are 
secure in federal court, but even so enforcement would be delayed by the litigation, and 
both delay and the litigation itself are costly.  To discourage such suits the group’s 
charter would stipulate that bringing a previously arbitrated dispute to court would serve 
immediately to evict the suing tribe from group membership, forcing it henceforth to 
rely entirely on its own besmirched reputation.  The other members would then permit 
the aggrieved investors to bring suit in their own tribal courts to attach assets of the 
offending tribe that were being held within those jurisdictions.  An action in federal 
court seeking to overturn those tribal awards would force one sovereign to sue other 
sovereigns who, as a condition of their group membership, would categorically have 
refused to waive any immunity against that suit.  There would of course be no charter 
stipulation barring a tribe from initiating a suit to enforce an arbitrator’s award that was 
favorable to the tribe if the investors refused to abide by it.  
[T]rusted private arbitrators provide an alternative to a court system, not by directly 
enforcing contracts but by generating the public information necessary to allow 
reputational mechanisms to enforce them.   Third parties [need not] investigate a dispute 
in detail in order to learn who was at fault.  They [need only] find out which party the 
[arbitrator has] ruled against.  …  If private enforcement of contracts via reputation and 
social pressure is less expensive and more reliable than enforcement via the court 
system, people whose social institutions make such private enforcement practical have a 
competitive advantage over those who must rely on the courts (Friedman 2000, 146). 
 
                                                 
30 Though their legal systems left domestic investment highly insecure, present and former communist 
countries greatly improved their ability to enter capital markets by inserting contractual clauses that 
compelled arbitration, a Swiss arbitrator often being designated (Böckstiegal 1984; Benson 1999). 
 
31 The use of hostage assets to bond agreements was discussed in Williamson (1983; 1984). 
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Even if the group were of modest size to begin with, early improvements in the 
members’ ability to attract investors would induce additional tribes to apply for 
membership.  As new tribes joined investors awareness of the group would gradually 
increase and the value of membership would grow.  With scrupulous ex post 
enforcement of their clear ex ante intentions, the tribal group might soon find that 
investors considered its members more desirable investment sites than some less 
dependable states.  Since state and national courts would rarely be required to adjudicate 
member-investor disputes, the tribal group would unilaterally have retrieved an 




As a group, the indigenous peoples of the Americas suffer the continents’ worst 
poverty, education, and health (Carlson 1997).  The early period of contact between 
Indians and Europeans often witnessed mutually beneficial exchanges while later years 
witnessed substantial conflict,
  but one way or another most of the accessible and 
productive land between Tierra del Fuego and Hudson Bay eventually became owned 
by the immigrants and their progeny, or by their governments.  Well over a century after 
the 1886 defeat of Geronimo’s Apache band—the last to pose a serious military threat 
within the United States—utilization of the residual Indian resources remains severely 
encumbered by government policy designed for tribes posing a military threat to the 
United States and consisting of primitive people unready to cope with a modern world.  
Maladroit national constraints on Indian resource utilization translate into poor 
incentives for investment. 
But Indians are sovereign, subordinate to the national sovereign, in many ways 
parallel to states.  Indian sovereignty has recently been enhanced not by any substantial 
strengthening of individual sovereignty of tribal members but by recapturing limited 
tribal sovereignty from states and more extensive tribal power over consensual 
arrangements.  States are the tribes’ chief competitors for investment—competitors with 
two notable advantages:  States have a great deal of ongoing enterprise that has tested 
their inclinations and supplied a grown body of precedent, and, being larger, individual 
states risk substantially more in the way of future investments than individual tribes do.     28
It is a mistake to view the dearth of tribal precedent mainly as a problem for 
investors—they often have reasonably good off-reservation substitute opportunities.  It 
is instead a problem for the tribes.  Rightly or wrongly, many investors are skeptical of 
tribal courts while Indians are skeptical of state courts.  There are undoubtedly many 
ways to ameliorate that problem while a good tribal reputation is formed.  Perhaps 
counterintuitively, but one tool for reassuring potential investors would be for tribes 
consciously to structure their laws and contracts with an eye to facilitating federal court 
intervention in disputes, or even evicting that court system altogether through formation 
of intertribal compacts that would compel arbitration and mutual bonding of 
commitments.  Given that the cost falls more heavily on tribes than on potential 
investors, crafting a solution would likewise be of more benefit to tribes than investors.   
Humans seem hardwired to see economic relationships as a series of zero-sum 
games where one party benefits only if another suffers (Rubin 2003), but modern life 
actually is full of mutually-beneficial opportunities.  In those positive sum games the 
main problem is not how to take a larger share from a partner, but how to persuade a 
stranger to become a partner in the first place.  If so, then when the intent of the parties 
was clear ex ante it is bound to be mutually disadvantageous in the long run to seize ex 
post opportunities that are inconsistent with that intent.  Though a bird in the hand 
might be worth two in the bush, it is doubtful that bird could be worth two hundred, two 
thousand, or two million birds in the bush.     29
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APPENDIX: Reservation Land Quality 
 
 
Obtaining reliable market measures of Indian land quality is difficult—with so 
much Indian land held in trust by the United States, little of it trades in fee simple.  If 
the trustee acted as a responsible, competent agent one might infer land quality from the 
present value of the flow of royalties for surface and mineral rights, but the trustee does 
not behave that way (Anderson and Lueck 1992; Clinton, Goldberg, and Tsosie 2003, 
508-25).  Instead, we exploit state level data on private farmland value (USDA 1997) to 
infer potential value of Indian land in the same state, using reservation area by state 
(U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs 1995, D2-D3).
32  We multiply Indian acreage in a state 
by the average per acre value of all farm real estate in that state to estimate very roughly 
the potential value of the state’s Indian land.  Aggregating across states and dividing by 
total Indian acreage aggregated across those same states yields a rough estimate of the 
average potential per acre value of Indian land.  That is then compared with that of all 
farm real estate in the lower forty-eight states,
33 implying a potential average per acre 
value of Indian land between 73% and 76% of the national average.   
Computed that way, the obvious source of difference between the Indian and 
national averages arises because tribes were nearly always moved away from coastal 
locations where land values are relatively high and toward arid and semi-arid interior 
locations.  As illustration, consider that the Cherokee were forcibly removed from 
southeastern states, where average farm real estate values are now roughly $1,700 per 
acre, to a smaller area in Oklahoma, where the corresponding value is $610.  Similarly, 
some bands of Dakota Indians were forced from Minnesota, where average land value is 
$1,160 per acre, to reservations in the two states now named for the tribe, where, as with 
the Cherokee, average land values are on the order of one-third of the level in the 
                                                 
32 The published BIA data includes only the twenty states that have the largest Indian land areas, New 
York being the twentieth with three-tenths of one percent of the total.  As map 1 indicates, however, 
reservation land is highly concentrated west of the one-hundredth meridian, and the data coverage is 
nearly 95%. 
 
33 Only Arizona contains more Indian land than Alaska, but the Federal Census of Agriculture makes no 
estimate of the per acre value of Alaskan farm real estate.  Consequently Alaska could not be used in our 
estimate.  If, as seems likely due to climate and transport disadvantages, per acre Alaskan farm real estate 
value is at or near the national minimum, including that state would lower our estimate of reservation land 
value potential.  No Indians came from Hawaii nor were any removed there.  Native Hawaiians are 
beyond the scope of this book, but in any event that population has never been treated by the United 
States as a sovereign nation (perhaps to their loss) nor placed under the trusteeship of the BIA (certainly 
to their gain). 
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original homeland.  Roughly ninety percent of Indian land in the lower forty-eight states 
is in the mountains, deserts, and western plains, more than half in only three states—
Arizona, New Mexico, and South Dakota (U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs 1995, D2-D3).  
Among the lower forty-eight states that contain as much as one-percent of Indian land, 
only Oregon and Washington have seacoasts, and even there reservations are 
predominately trans-mountain rather than on the well-watered western slopes.   
If Indian land values within states are as biased as they are within the nation, our 
estimate is an upper bound.  For instance, the citrus and vegetable farms of Arizona that 
rely on irrigation water from the Colorado River must account for much of that state’s 
farm value, but most reservation land is on the state’s opposite side.  Throughout the 
U.S. those reservations that were surveyed and allotted among tribal members, with 
“surplus” land sold by the trustee to the U.S. government for white homesteading, were 
selected from those with the most potentially productive land.  Though the remaining 
tribal land is proving increasingly useful for non-agricultural purposes, that was hardly 
expected, intended, or germane when reservations were being formed.   